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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper studies the extent of bank competition in the 
Middle East and Northern Africa region during 1994–
2008, using non-structural measures of competition 
such as the H-statistic and the Lerner index. Both these 
measures suggest that banking sector competition in 
the region is lower relative to other regions and has not 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Middle East and Northern Africa 
Region; and Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in 
these departments to analyze bank competition in the Middle East and Northern Africa Region, in particular, and across 
developing countries more generally. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at danzoategui@worldbank.org, mmartinezperia@worldbank.org, rrocha@worldbank.org. 
improved in recent years. An analysis of the determinants 
of competition across countries suggests that lower levels 
of competition in the Middle East and Northern Africa 
are explained by the region’s worse credit information 
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1.  Introduction 
Banking sectors in the Middle East and Northern Africa Region (MENA) are among the biggest 
and deepest in the developing world (see Figure 1), but are they competitive? This paper 
investigates the extent of bank competition in the MENA region, compares it to that observed in 
other regions, and analyzes the factors that explain the differences in bank competition between 
MENA and other regions. Assessing bank competition in MENA is important, because an 
extensive literature has shown that higher levels of bank competition are associated with lower 
prices for banking products, increased access to finance, and greater bank efficiency. At the same 
time, recent studies have shown that bank competition can also be good for stability by limiting 
the emergence of “too big to fail” institutions that take excessive risks.
1  
There are two main approaches to measuring bank competition: the structural approach 
and the non-structural approach. As the name suggests, the structural approach assesses bank 
competition by examining measures of market structure such as concentration ratios (the share of 
assets held by the top 3/5 institutions) or indices (e.g., the Herfindhal index). The theoretical 
justification for using concentration as a measure of competition comes from the so called 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, which postulates that fewer and larger firms (higher 
concentration) are more likely to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
2 However, studies have 
shown that at times concentration is not a reliable measure of competition (see Cetorelli, 1999) 
and the link between concentration and performance is not always positive as suggested by the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (see Jackson, 1992). 
In contrast to the structural approach, the non-structural approach, based on the so-called 
“New Empirical Industrial Organization literature”, measures competition without using explicit 
information about the structure of the market. Instead, non-structural measures focus on 
obtaining estimates of market power from the observed behavior of banks. For example, Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) show that the sum of the elasticities of a firm’s revenue with respect to the 
firm’s input prices - the so-called H-statistic - can be used to identify the extent of competition in 
                                                 
 
1 For studies on the impact of competition see Koskela and Stenbacka (2000), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2004), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Carletti, Hartmann, 
and Spagnolo (2007), Schaeck and Cihak (2008), among others. 
2 For a discussion on the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm see Berger (1995). 3 
 
a market. Under perfect competition, the H-statistic should be equal to one, since any increase in 
input prices should lead to a one-to-one increase in total revenues. This is true because those 
firms that cannot cover their increase in input prices will be forced to exit the market. By 
contrast, H will be negative if the firm operates as a monopoly—an upward shift in the marginal 
cost curve will be associated with a reduction in revenue as a result of the optimality condition 
for the monopolist. If the banking sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, the H 
statistic will lie between zero and one. An alternative non-structural measure of competition, the 
Lerner index, measures the markup firms charge their customers by calculating the disparity 
between price and marginal costs expressed as a percentage of the price. Higher values of the 
Lerner index imply lower levels of bank competition. 
Though there is an extensive literature using non-structural measures to assess 
competition in many developed and in some developing countries, to the best of our knowledge, 
there are only three papers that conduct this kind of analysis for the MENA region.
3 All three 
compute the H-statistic as the measure of competition. Murjan and Ruza (2002) investigate the 
degree of competition during the period 1993-1997 in nine MENA countries.
4(The authors find 
that MENA banking sectors operate under monopolistic competition and Gulf Cooperation 
Council’s (GCC) economies tend to be less competitive than non-oil producing countries. 
Analyzing bank competition in GCC economies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates) for the period 1993-2002, Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) also 
concludes that the banking sectors in these economies operate under monopolistic competition.  
A more recent paper, Turk-Ariss (2009), analyzes competition in 12 MENA economies during 
the period 2000-2006.
5 This paper also conducts an investigation of the factors that explain 
differences in bank competition across MENA countries. Consistent with previous research, the 
                                                 
3 Studies using non-structural measures to examine competition in developed countries include: Nathan and Neave 
(1989), Shaffer (1993), Molyneux et al. (1994, 1996), Bikker and Groeneveld (1998), Hondroyiannis et al. (1999), 
De Bandt and Davis (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2002), Hempell (2002), Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), Coccorese 
(2004, 2005) , Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005, 2007), Gischer and Stiele (2008), and Carbó et al. (2009).  There 
are fewer studies focusing on developing countries. These include: Gelos and Roldos (2004), which examine 
banking sector competition in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey; 
Mkrtchyan (2005), which focuses on Armenia; Prasad and Ghosh (2005), which investigates the case of India; 
Mamatzakis et al. (2005), Drakos and Konstantinou (2005), and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) that study 
competition in Central and Eastern European countries; and Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007), which analyzes banking 
competition in Latin America.  
4  Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates  
5 The countries considered in Turk-Ariss (2009) are Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates. 4 
 
paper finds that most banking sectors in MENA operate under monopolistic competition. 
Furthermore, the paper concludes that indicators of market contestability and activity restrictions 
are important factors in determining the degree of competition across countries in the region.  
Our paper contributes to the study of bank competition in MENA in four different ways. 
First, the study analyzes two distinct measures of competition - the H-statistic and the Lerner 
index - over a longer period of time, 1994-2008. Second, the paper examines the behavior of 
competition within MENA over time and tests for differences across two sub-periods: 1994-2001 
and 2002-2008. Third, the paper compares the extent of banking sector competition in MENA to 
that observed in other regions of the developing world. Finally, the paper conducts an analysis of 
the factors that explain differences in competition between MENA and other regions. 
Our estimations of the H-statistic and the Lerner index show that banking sectors in 
MENA operate under monopolistic competition. Furthermore, comparisons over time indicate 
that competition has not improved and, in many cases, has worsened over time within MENA.  
Relative to other regions, MENA is lagging behind in terms of bank competition. Our evaluation 
of the factors explaining differences in banking sector competition between MENA and other 
regions suggests that a worse credit information environment and stricter regulations and 
practices governing bank entry are to blame. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodological 
approach and describes the data we use to obtain the non-structural measures of competition. 
Section 3 presents the non-structural measures of competition for each country in MENA, 
analyzes their behavior over time, and compares bank competition in MENA to that in other 
developing countries. Section 4 details the methodology we employ to analyze differences in 
competition between MENA and other regions. Section 5 reports the results of our analysis of 
the drivers of competition in MENA. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Methodologies and data to compute the non-structural measures of competition 
Based on the Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) methodology and following the empirical strategy 
pursued by Classes and Laeven (2004), we obtain the H-statistic by estimating equation (1) 
below: 5 
 
Ln(Pit)= αi + β1 ln(W1,it) + β2 ln(W2,it) + β3 ln(W3,it) +  γ ln(Z,it) + δD + εit  (1) 
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. P is the ratio of gross revenues to total assets (proxy 
for banks’ output price), W1 is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market 
funding (proxy for input price of deposits), W2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
(proxy for input price of labor) and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses 
to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). Z is a matrix of controls 
including the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio of net loans to total assets, and the logarithm 
of assets. D is a matrix of year dummies. Finally, αi  denote bank-level fixed effects. 
The H-statistic equals β1+β2+β3, the sum of the input price elasticities of total revenues. 
Conceptually, the statistic measures the responsiveness of bank revenues to input prices. An H- 
statistic less or equal to 0 is interpreted as a sign of a monopoly; H equal to 1 indicates perfect 
competition, and H is between 0 and 1 when the sector operates under monopolistic competition.  
The test of perfect competition is only valid if the market is in long-run equilibrium. To 
verify this condition, the following regression is estimated: 
Ln(ROAit)= αi + β1 ln(W1,it) + β2 ln(W2,it) + β3 ln(W3,it) +  γ ln(Z,it) + δD + εit  (2) 
Where ROA is the pre-tax return on assets. Because ROA can take on negative values, we 
compute the dependent variable as ln(1+ROA). We define the equilibrium E-statistic as 
β1+β2+β3 from equation (2). The test of long-run equilibrium involves testing whether E=0. In 
other words, the market is in equilibrium if return on assets is not related to input prices.  
The Lerner Index is computed using the formula (P-MC) / P, where P is the price of 
banking outputs and MC is the marginal costs. Following the approach in Fernandez de Guevara, 
Maudos and Perez (2005, 2007) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008), we proxy bank 
output using total assets, P is calculated as total bank revenues over assets, and MC is calculated 
by taking the derivative from a translog cost function shown in equation (3): 6 
 
Ln(Cit) = a0i + b0 ln(Qit) + b1 0.5 [ln(Qit)]
2 + a1 ln(W1it )+ a2 ln(W2it) + a3 ln(W3it)+  
   +b2 0.5 ln(Qit)*ln(W1it) + b3 0.5 ln(Qit)*ln(W2it) + b4 0.5 ln(Qit)*ln(W3it) +  
   + a4 ln(W1it)*ln(W2it) + a5 ln(W1it)*ln(W3it) +a6 ln(W2it)*ln(W3it) + 
   + a7 0.5[ln(W1it)]
2 + a8 0.5[ln(W2it)]
2 + a9 0.5[ln(W3it)]
2 + δD + uit  (3) 
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. C is total operating plus financial costs, Q is total 
assets, W1, W2, and W3 are the same input prices used in equations (1) and (2) and defined above. 
D and α0i denote time effects and bank-level fixed effects, respectively. As in most papers, our 
estimations impose the restrictions of symmetry and degree one homogeneity in the price of 
inputs.
6  
We compute the H-statistic and the Lerner index using bank-level balance sheet and 
income statement data from Bankscope for the period 1994-2008. The sample for MENA 
includes data on 250 commercial and Islamic banks, operating in 12 MENA countries, namely: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates. Table 1 shows the number of banks and observations for 
each country in our sample.  
We compare competition in MENA to that in other regions using similar Bankscope data 
for 3,785 banks operating in 122 countries across 6 regions. Table 2 lists the countries included 
in each region and reports the number of banks and observations that go into the calculations of 
the H-statistic and the Lerner index for each region. 
3.  Empirical results on the non-structural measures of competition 
3.a. H- Statistic 
Table 3 shows H-statistics for individual countries in MENA over two periods: 1994-2001 and 
2002-2008. Also, this table reports p-values for tests of whether H is equal to 0 and the market 
can be best characterized as a monopoly or H is equal to 1 and the market operates under perfect 
competition.   
                                                 
6 However, the results do not change if we drop these constraints. 7 
 
Considering the most recent period (2002-2008) in all countries we are able to reject the 
null that the banking sector is best characterized by a monopoly (null H=0). At the same time, 
with the exception of Oman, we are able to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition (i.e., the 
null that H=1) across all countries. Overall, this evidence suggests that banking sectors in MENA 
are best characterized as markets operating under monopolistic competition. Furthermore, Table 
3 reveals that, in general, competition throughout MENA has either declined or not changed 
significantly since the second half of the 1990s. The drop in the value of the H- statistic between 
1994-2001 and 2002-2008 is statistically significant in the case of Tunisia and Kuwait. For the 
remaining countries we find no evidence of changes and, in particular, improvements in 
competition since the mid-1990s. 
Table 4 reports values of the H-statistic across regions, calculated over the period 1994-
2008, and for the most recent 2002-2008 period.
7 In the case of the MENA region, to distinguish 
oil producers from other countries, we report individual statistics for Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates-, 
separate from the rest, which we label as “Non-GCC” countries. The H-statistics for GCC 
countries are lower than those for non-GCC countries, suggesting that the former are less 
competitive than the latter, however, these differences are not statistically significant.  
Comparing MENA to other regions, we find that the H-statistic for MENA is 
significantly lower than that for countries in Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Latin 
America, and South Asia both in the most recent period, 2002-2008, and in the longer period, 
1994-2008. On the other hand, we find no difference in the H-statistic for MENA and that for 
East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions with the lowest level of banking sector 
competition according to the H.  
3.b. Lerner index 
Figure 2 shows plots of the Lerner index for each of the 12 MENA countries throughout 1994-
2008. It is clear from these graphs that most countries in MENA seem to have witnessed an 
                                                 
7 To calculate the H-statistic for each region, we pool the observations for all countries in each region, while 
including country and time fixed effects, and estimate one value of the H-statistic for each region following the 
methodology described in Section 2.  8 
 
increase in the Lerner index. Table 5 reports the average for the Lerner index across the same 
two periods we examined in the case of the H-statistic, namely 1994-2001 and 2002-2008. Also, 
this table reports the p-values for a t-test of whether the average of the Lerner index changes 
across periods. With the exception of Egypt, where the Lerner seems to have declined over time, 
and Morocco and Tunisia, where we cannot reject the null of no change, for all other countries, 
our tests indicate an increase in market power among banks over time.  
Relative to other regions, the Lerner index for both Non-GCC but, especially, for GCC 
countries is higher. Table 6 reports the average Lerner index across regions for the period 1994-
2008 and for the recent period, 2002-2008. Over the most recent period, we see that the average 
Lerner for GCC countries is higher than those for all other regions. Furthermore, these 
differences are statistically significant in all cases. In the case of Non-GCC countries, the Lerner 
index is higher for these countries relative to that for Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, but the differences do not appear to be statistically significant. Overall, the 
evidence based on the non-structural measures of competition suggests that banking sectors in 
MENA, and, in particular, those in GCC countries are less competitive than those in most other 
regions. 
4.  Methodology and data to evaluate what drives differences in competition across 
regions 
In order to understand why banking sectors in MENA are less competitive than those in other 
regions in the developing world, we conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of 
competition across countries. We use the H-statistic as our summary measure of competition 
across countries.
8 In particular, using bank-level Bankscope data for the period 2002-2008, we 
calculate the H-statistic for all countries for which at least 50 observations are available. With 
these data we run cross-country regressions in order to investigate the potential factors that 
explain banking competition in MENA.  
Our estimations include the following two steps. First, as shown in equation (4) below, 
we regress the H-statistics against a dummy for countries in MENA (i.e., a variable that takes 
                                                 
8 However, results do not change significantly if we use the Lerner index instead. 9 
 
values of 1 for countries in the region and 0 otherwise). Equation (4) is estimated to determine 
whether indeed as reported in Section 3 the non-structural measures of competition for MENA 
are different and, in particular, are worse than for all other regions. In other words, the purpose 
of estimating equation (4) is to test whether the MENA dummy is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the value of the H-statistic is lower among countries in MENA.  
H-statistici = 0 + 1MENAi + ui  (4) 
Second, we estimate equation (5) incorporating potential determinants of competition.  
The purpose of estimating equation (5) is to assess the factors that help explain the differences in 
competition between MENA and other regions.  If once we control for the additional variables in 
equation (5), the MENA dummy is no longer significant, we can establish the factors driving 
differences in competition by looking at the variables that are statistically significant. 
H-statistici = 0 + 1MENAi + 2Concentrationi + 3Contestabilityi +  
4Credit information environmenti + 5 Non-bank financial institutionsi + ei  (5) 
Following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Turk-Ariss (2009), we consider a number of 
factors as potential determinants of competition. First, we include a measure of concentration. 
According to the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, we would expect a negative 
association between concentration and competition.  In equation (5) Concentration refers to the 
average share of assets held by the top three banks over the period 2002-2008. We use data from 
Bankscope to compute the aforementioned variable. The second column of Table 7 shows the 
average concentration ratios across regions. The average concentration ratio for MENA (57.8%) 
is higher than that of South Asia, East Asia, and Latin America, but it is lower than that of 
Former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Hence, the examination of the 
concentration ratios reveals that while concentration in MENA is high, the ratios are line and, in 
many cases, are lower than what we observe in other regions. 
Second, we consider as potential determinants of competition a number of variables that 
help characterize the degree to which the banking sector is contestable (i.e., it has low barriers to 
entry and exit).We expect more contestable markets to be more competitive since the threat of 
entry and exit reduces the ability of incumbents to exercise market power (see Claessens and 10 
 
Laeven, 2004 and Turk-Assis, 2009). Due to lack of data on barriers to exit for several countries, 
we only focus on bank entry. Specifically, Contestability is a matrix which includes the 
following variables: (i) initial capital required for a bank to start operations, (ii) the number of 
requirements that have to be satisfied by institutions applying for a banking license, and (iii) the 
percentage of applications for licenses that have been denied. These data come from the World 
Bank 2007 Survey on Bank Regulation and Supervision.
9 
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 7 compare the mentioned entry requirements in MENA with 
those of other regions. We find that with the exception of East Asia, where capital requirements 
are also very high, capital requirements in MENA and, in particular, in GCC countries 
significantly exceed those of all other regions. Also, the number of procedures a bank must 
comply with to obtain a license is higher in MENA relative to most regions.
10 When it comes to 
the number of applications denied, the rejection rate in MENA also exceeds those of all other 
regions.  
Third, we consider a measure of the scope, access, and quality of credit information to 
capture the extent to which credit information is widely available and shared by all banks. 
Dell’Ariccia  et al. (1999) show that to the extent that access to credit information is limited, 
incumbent banks are more able to exercise market power and to limit bank entry. Hence, we 
expect a positive association between the scope, access, and quality of credit information and the 
degree of competition across countries.  We measure the Credit information environment as the 
average over the period 2005-2008 of the index of credit information compiled by the World 
Bank Doing Business Indicators. This index takes values from 0 to 6 with larger numbers 
representing greater scope, access, and quality of credit information. Column 6 of Table 7 shows 
that MENA’s credit information index (2.9) is relatively low compared to other developing 
regions. In fact, it is only higher than Sub-Saharan Africa (2.0) and Former Soviet Union (2.0). 
                                                 
9 These data can be found at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:
64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html 
10 Across countries in MENA, there is no variation in the number of requirements for entry. Across all countries, 
banks are required to present (1) draft by laws, (2) intended organizational charts, (3) financial projections for the 
first years of operation, (4) financial information on potential shareholders, (5) background/experience of future 




Finally, as in Claessens and Laeven (2004), in order to gauge the impact of the presence 
of non-bank institutions we include two variables: (i) the share of assets held by insurance 
companies, pension, and mutual funds, and (ii) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. 
We expect that in countries with more important non-bank financial institutions and deeper 
capital markets banks will face higher levels of competition. The last two columns of Table 7 
show that MENA’s capital markets are larger than those of the other developing regions. In turn, 
non-bank financial institutions’ size in MENA is smaller than that of all regions except for the 
economies of the Former Soviet Union. 
5.  Empirical results for the factors driving differences in competition across regions 
Table 8 shows the results for the estimations exploring the determinants of difference in 
competition between MENA and other regions. Column 2 of Table 8 shows that the H-statistic is 
lower in MENA relative to other developing countries around the world. This confirms what we 
established in Section 3, namely, that banking sectors in MENA are less competitive relative to 
those in other regions. In columns 3 through 5, we include additional variables to try to explain 
the factors driving the differences observed in the extent of competition in MENA vis-a-vis other 
countries. We find that the index capturing the credit information environment and measures of 
the ease of entry into banking help explain differences in competition across countries. In 
particular, once we control for these variables, we find no difference between competition in 
MENA and other regions, suggesting that these are the factors that explain why competition in 
MENA is lower. At the same time, we find evidence that in countries where the size of non-bank 
financial intermediaries (stock markets, pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies) 
is larger, competition is more pronounced. 
6.  Conclusions  
Banking sectors in MENA are relatively developed, but are they competitive? This paper 
provides significant evidence that banking sector competition in MENA is lower than in most 
regions of the developing world and has not improved over time. In particular, non-structural 
measures of competition such as the H-statistic and the Lerner Index show that banking sectors 
in MENA are lagging behind in terms of competition.  12 
 
Our evaluation of the factors explaining differences in banking sector competition 
between MENA and other regions suggests that a worse credit information environment and 
stricter regulations and practices governing bank entry are to blame. Hence, measures to promote 
competition in MENA should focus on making banking sectors in the region more contestable 
and on improving the scope, access, and quality of credit information among banks. Also, we 
find that countries where stock markets and other non-bank financial intermediaries play a 
significant role tend to have more competitive banking sectors, suggesting that policies that 
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Table 1: MENA sample (1994-2008) 
 




Algeria  17  93 
Bahrain  27  191 
Egypt  34  381 
Jordan  13  163 
Kuwait  10  104 
Lebanon  66  605 
Morocco  11  86 
Oman  10  91 
Qatar  8  76 
Saudi Arabia  13  138 
Tunisia  17  190 
United Arab Emirates 24  214 
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Table 2:  Other developing regions sample (1994-2008) 
 
 




    
East Asia and Pacific  Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Korea, 
Laos, Malaysia, Micronesia, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Western 
Samoa. 
 458  2922 
Eastern Europe  Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYROM), 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovenia 
 426  2748 
Former Soviet Union  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
 1245  5492 
Latin America 
 and Caribbean 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 960  6082 
South Asia  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
 194  1918 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo 
Democratic Rep., Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
& Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
   502  3003 
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Table 3: H-statistics for MENA countries 









null   
H[94-01]= 
H[02-08] 
Algeria 1994-2001  0.614  0.161  0.002  0.029  0.575 
2002-2008 0.512 0.119  0.001  0.001 
Bahrain 1994-2001  0.375  0.156  0.024  0.000  0.407 
2002-2008 0.452 0.181  0.019  0.005 
Egypt 1994-2001  0.746  0.075  0.000  0.002 
0.261 
2002-2008 0.625
a 0.080  0.000  0.000 
Jordan 1994-2001  0.593  0.091  0.000  0.001  0.448 
2002-2008 0.480 0.116  0.001  0.001 
Kuwait 1994-2001  0.476  0.109  0.002  0.001  0.066 
2002-2008 0.299 0.123  0.038  0.000 
Lebanon 1994-2001  0.650  0.095  0.000  0.000  0.712 
2002-2008 0.627 0.088  0.000  0.000 
Morocco 1994-2001  0.277
a 0.148  0.091  0.001  0.243 
2002-2008 0.503 0.083  0.000  0.000 
Oman 1994-2001  0.822  0.128  0.000  0.196  0.528 
2002-2008 0.678 0.185  0.005  0.116 
Qatar 1994-2001  0.079  0.309  0.805  0.021  0.152 
2002-2008 0.496 0.189  0.034  0.032 
Saudi Arabia  1994-2001  0.756  0.068  0.000  0.004  0.132 
2002-2008 0.605 0.103  0.000  0.002 
Tunisia 1994-2001  0.578  0.086  0.000  0.000  0.001 
2002-2008 0.376 0.089  0.001  0.000 
United Arab Emirates  1994-2001 0.882 0.088  0.000  0.195  0.124 
2002-2008 0.723 0.088  0.000  0.004 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Bankscope data following the methodology described in Section 2.
  
a denotes cases where we reject the null that the market is in long-run equilibrium. 
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Table 4: H-statistics across regions 
Regions  H-stat            
(94-08) 
H-stat            
(02-08) 
Middle East & Northern Africa  0.520  0.482 
   GCC Countries  0.497  0.470 
   Non-GCC Countries  0.528  0.508 







P-value H = H GCC  0.07  0.12 







P-value H = H GCC  0.00  0.00 
P-value H = H Non-GCC  0.00  0.00 
 





P-value H = H GCC  0.01  0.00 







P-value H = H GCC  0.00  0.00 







P-value H = H GCC  0.00  0.01 







P-value H = H GCC  0.70  0.51 
P-value H = H Non-GCC  0.83  0.85 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Bankscope data following the 
methodology described in Section 2. 
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Table 5: Lerner index for MENA countries across periods 
Countries  Period  Lerner   P-value null  
94-01 = 02-08 
Algeria 
1994-2001 0.288  0.00 
2002-2008 0.473 
Bahrain 
1994-2001 0.248  0.00 
2002-2008 0.375 
Egypt 
1994-2001 0.220  0.04 
2002-2008 0.193 
Jordan 
1994-2001 0.147  0.00 
2002-2008 0.309 
Kuwait 
1994-2001 0.217  0.00 
2002-2008 0.412 
Lebanon 
1994-2001 0.119  0.01 
2002-2008 0.144 
Morocco 
1994-2001 0.316  0.29 
2002-2008 0.288 
Oman 
1994-2001 0.264  0.00 
2002-2008 0.399 
Qatar 
1994-2001 0.283  0.00 
2002-2008 0.501 
Saudi Arabia 
1994-2001 0.268  0.00 
2002-2008 0.470 
Tunisia 
1994-2001 0.242  0.14 
2002-2008 0.211 
United Arab Emirates 
1994-2001 0.332  0.00 
   2002-2008 0.438   
Source: authors’ calculations based on Bankscope data, following the methodology described in Section 2. 
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Table 6: The Lerner index across regions 
Regions Average 
Lerner     
(94-08) 
Average 
Lerner     
(02-08) 
Middle East & Northern Africa  0.320  0.373 
   GCC Countries  0.360  0.435 
   Non-GCC Countries  0.241  0.258 







P-value Lerner = Lerner GCC  0.00  0.00 







P-value Lerner = Lerner GCC  0.00  0.00 
P-value Lerner = Lerner Non-GCC  0.24  0.24 
 





P-value Lerner = Lerner GCC  0.00  0.00 







P-value Lerner = Lerner GCC  0.00  0.00 







P-value Lerner = Lerner GCC  0.02  0.00 







P-value Lerner = Lerner GCC  0.04  0.02 
P-value Lerner = Lerner Non-GCC  0.81  0.45 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Bankscope data, following the  
methodology described in Section 2 
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assets to GDP 
(%) 
Middle East & Northern  
Africa  57.8  91.8  24.2  8  2.9  77.2  12.4 
   GCC Countries  54.3  158.4  23.9  8  3.3  87.5  4.1 
   Non-GCC Countries  60.7  38.4  24.5  8  2.6  67.0  14.5 
East Asia  45.1  216.7  4.6  8  4.2  72.7  42.9 
Eastern Europe  59.3  8.1  7.6  7.8  3.6  22.7  12.7 
Former Soviet Union  60.1  7.6  20.2  7.5  2.0  27.8  5.0 
Latin America  50.3  28.6  7.8  7.5  5.1  23.6  20.9 
South Asia  45.0  27.6  21.6  6.7  3.2  40.9  25.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  70.1  10.0  12.7  8  2.0  56.2  43.7 
Source: Assets held by top 3 banks was calculated by the authors using data from Bankscope; Minimum capital 
requirements, Applications for bank licenses denied, and Number of entry requirements come from the World Bank 2007 
Survey on Bank Regulation and Supervision. The Credit information index was taken from the World Bank Doing Business 
Indicators, whereas the Stock market capitalization comes from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). Non-bank financial 
institutions assets to GDP was computed using a variety of sources such as OECD, International Federation of Pension 
Funds Administrators, Investment Company Institute, AXCO Insurance Information Service, and national sources. 
  23 
 
Table 8: Exploring the determinants of bank competition across regions 
Independent variables  Dependent variable: H-statistic 
 
Dummy MENA = 1  -0.137 -0.079 -0.106  -0.016
[-3.04]*** [-1.64] [-1.97]*  [-0.20]
Concentration    -0.161 -0.035  -0.167
  [-1.09] [-0.20]  [-1.06]
Credit Information Index    0.036 0.024  0.03
  [2.79]*** [1.87]*  [2.09]**
Minimum capital requirement (billions)   -0.013 -0.173  -0.03
  [-0.09] [-1.05]  [-0.16]
Percentage of bank license applications denied   -0.084 -0.266  -0.081
  [-0.98] [-2.25]**  [-0.81]
No. of entry requirements    -0.065 -0.108  -0.093
  [-1.99]* [-3.30]***  [-2.92]***
Stock market capitalization    0.139 
  [3.21]*** 
Non-bank financial institutions       0.169
     [3.10]***
Constant  0.657 1.127 1.42  1.341
[28.48]*** [4.69]*** [5.52]***  [5.08]***
Observations (number of countries)  67 54 45  43 
R-squared  0.081 0.381 0.499  0.464
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Figure 2: Lerner index for MENA countries (continued) 
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